Devastation in
Putumayo and an Expanding War: The Effects of Plan Colombia

by Phillip Cryan
Don Fernando Castillo(1) and his
family took a serious gamble last fall. Having survived in recent years
by growing coca--the raw material for cocaine--this family from the small
community of El Placer in Putumayo State, southern Colombia, took out
loans from three different banks to invest in seeds and equipment from
Ecuador to start growing black pepper plants instead. Don Fernando put
2,000 wooden posts in the ground to support the pepper plants; his son
put in another 500.
Just after dawn on the morning
of November 24, 2001, all 2,500 plants were destroyed. Crop-dusting planes
dropped an enhanced formulation of Monsanto's Roundup herbicide (active
ingredient glyphosate) onto Don Fernando's fields. Not only pepper but
also yucca, papaya, coffee and pineapple plants were destroyed, along
with a few small patches of coca. The planes are sold to the Colombian
government by the U.S. as part of Plan Colombia--an aid package that has
delivered over US$1 billion to Colombia's police and military since 2000.
Most of the Castillo's neighbors, whose crops were also hit by the herbicide
sprayings that day, abandoned their land, moving to the cities or heading
further into the rainforest to plant coca. Don Fernando has been farming
his land for 37 years.
When the Castillos invested in
pepper, they signed a "social pact" with the Colombian government.
Over 30,000 families signed similar pacts in Putumayo last year. The government
was to provide about US$860 worth of agricultural aid (livestock, equipment,
etc.). After receiving the aid, farmers would have 12 months to manually
eradicate their illicit crops (coca or the species of poppy used to make
heroin).(2) Like most signatories, Don Fernando and his family had not
yet received any aid and, like many other signatories, their crops were
killed by the spray-planes anyway. Don Fernando had placed three white
flags on tall poles in his pepper field, to let the crop-duster pilots
know that he had signed a pact and therefore should not be targeted.
Third round of spraying
The third round of herbicide-spraying
missions under Plan Colombia started in mid-November 2001 and was ongoing
as of late January 2002 when I visited Putumayo as part of a delegation
with Witness for Peace. The sprayings are part of an aggressive counter-narcotics
strategy initiated by the Clinton administration, attacking drug-production
at "the source"--the small farmers who barely eke out a living
growing drug-crops. Most of the program's funds go to the Colombian military
and police, purchasing helicopters (Blackhawks and Superhueys) and providing
training; the helicopters flank the crop-dusters on spraying missions
for protection. The aircraft (war helicopters and crop-dusters alike)
are often flown by U.S. pilots--employees of a Virginia-based company
called DynCorp, hired by the U.S. Department of State. DynCorp's staff
of "private contractors" is made up largely of former U.S. military,
Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency personnel.(3)
Denunciations of the sprayings'
effects on food security, human health and the environment have been made
regularly and emphatically by Colombian farmers, church leaders, local
mayors, governors, U.S. Congress members and human rights observers. All
these groups have called for an immediate stop to the aerial herbicide
sprayings and a growing chorus of international environmental and human
rights organizations, including the UN Drug Control Programme and many
members of the U.S. Congress, have joined them in this call. No independent
body has conducted tests of the chemical mixture in current use. The U.S.
Embassy in Colombia insists that the chemicals are harmless, and asks
Colombians to take their word for it rather than conduct independent tests--while
thousands of reports of adverse health and environmental effects come
in from southern Colombia. Even the Human Rights Ombudsman's office, a
ministry of the Colombian government, has not been able to obtain a sample
of the spray mixture for testing.(4)
Meanwhile, thousands of farmers
are displaced from their land by the spraying campaigns, many of them
furthering the destruction of the Amazon (an ecosystem often called "the
lungs of the world") by destroying trees to plant new coca crops.
One hundred thousand of Putumayo's inhabitants arrived in the last ten
years, displaced from central Colombia, where they had grown corn and
coffee, by the liberalization of Colombia's agricultural markets and the
collapse of international coffee prices.(5) Putumayo has no infrastructure
to support the marketing of legal food crops. Those farmers who manually
eradicate their illicit crops and sign social pacts with the government
are left with no agricultural alternatives and little faith in the government
when their legal food crops are destroyed in outright violation of the
pacts' terms.
Numerous reports of illnesses
caused by exposure to the sprayings--the most prevalent being fever, skin
rashes, respiratory problems, diarrhea, eye irritation and abdominal pain--have
come from southern Colombia since November 2000, when Plan Colombia fumigations
began.(6) During our January visit, we heard that two children had died
in the most recent round of sprayings.
Inadequate U.S. response
The U.S. Embassy officials with
whom we met, while saying that they would "certainly look into"
health complaints, simultaneously dismissed out of hand the very possibility
that such health effects could exist. During one meeting, the Embassy's
fumigations expert gave no response to my request to hear why the U.S.
is not applying the precautionary principle in this case; thousands of
reports of health problems seem like a compelling reason to take this
approach, even if the Embassy genuinely believes that the spraying is
safe.
Since September, the Embassy has
released two studies of health effects, arguing in the Executive Summary
of one that "in the vast majority of cases, reported health problems
are not caused by aerial spraying" while the other study makes a
similar claim.(7) Yet the studies are full of scientific and methodological
flaws that render their conclusions invalid.
The first study was conducted
in a community where the herbicide sprayings targeted poppy crops, and,
since coca is harder to kill than poppy, the chemicals are much less concentrated
over poppy-growing areas. Since over 90% of the sprayings target coca,
not poppy, drawing conclusions about the overall health effects of the
fumigations from a case-study in a poppy-growing area is scientifically
invalid, if not deliberately misleading. The study also looked at only
23 health cases, and discarded eight others without providing any information
about them or any rationale for doing so.
The second study, which involved
lab analyses of blood and urine samples from people exposed to the fumigations,
did not submit the samples for analysis until four months after exposure--over
two months beyond the time that any effects would be likely to be seen
if pesticide poisoning had occurred.(8) The Colombian epidemiologist and
health worker who collected the samples and gathered the baseline health
data for the study, Dyva Revelo, told us that the Embassy would not let
her see a draft of the report (which they had put together with her data,
and which would have her name on it) until it was ready for distribution.
In some communities in Putumayo,
the "health" section has recently been excised from the official
forms on which farmers are to register complaints about negative effects
of the fumigations, since the Embassy apparently considers such complaints
incredible.(9)
Witness for Peace
The Witness for Peace delegation
in which I participated took place in January 2001. Thirty seven U.S.
citizens--labor leaders, environmentalists, educators, counselors, students,
social workers, ranging from age 19 to 66--spent six days in Bogota. We
met with analysts, community leaders and government officials in an attempt
to better understand the complex Colombian conflict and the effects of
the U.S.'s expanding role there. For four days, the delegation split into
two sections: the labor group traveled to Barrancabermeja, an oil-producing
city where union organizers are regularly killed by right-wing paramilitaries
(over 60% of the trade unionists killed worldwide last year were killed
in Colombia); the rest of us traveled to Putumayo in the south, to see
fumigated fields, talk with farmers, and meet with church and campesino
(farmer) leaders.
In the south, we visited another
farm that belonged to Don Oscar Delgado,(10) an affable and hard-working
man who grew corn and kept pasture for grazing. Over ten acres of his
corn and pasture were destroyed in a recent herbicide-spraying campaign,
even though there were no illicit crops nearby. Many community leaders
we met with, as well as academics and policy analysts from Bogota, feel
that this spraying of large areas of legal crops without coca nearby is
not unusual. It is not so much that the spraying is "indiscriminate,"
we were told time and again, as that it appears to be deliberately targeting
legal as well as illicit crops. As the Colombian sociologist Teofilo Vasquez
put it, "Displacement is not a consequence but a strategy of this
war." But why would this be the case? Why would the Colombian or
U.S. government want to displace Putumayo's farmers?
The U.S. "War on Drugs"?
Answers to these questions are
not easily found. An overview of "War on Drugs" strategies and
a discussion of recent proposed changes in U.S. aid to Colombia may help
elucidate aspects of an answer, however.
The Drug War has, according to
its own stated goals, been a tremendous failure.(11) Drug price, availability
and purity--the three indicators used to assess the scale of the drug
problem in the U.S. and the success of efforts to redress it--have all
gotten significantly worse in recent years, despite expanding budgets
for domestic and international counter-narcotics initiatives. The U.S.
Drug War budget is 20 times larger now than it was when Ronald Reagan
took office in 1980.(12) When aggressive counter-narcotics measures reduced
coca production in Peru and Bolivia in the 1990s, new fields simply appeared
in Colombia. The total coca production of the three countries remained
practically constant over the decade--though Drug War advocates regularly
point to the successes of Peru and Bolivia to prove the War's viability
and efficacy.(13) It is hard to believe that all the officials driving
Drug War policy in the U.S. government are unaware of its demonstrated
lack of success in reducing drug availability and consumption.
When our delegation arrived at
a small airport in Putumayo--formerly a civilian airport, it has recently
been commandeered by the Colombian military--a fumigation mission was
just leaving. Four sleek planes flew in formation overhead, squirting
a few drops of chemicals to greet their friends on the ground. Large blue
plastic barrels were rolled out to be filled with the Roundup mixture.
One Blackhawk and three Superhuey helicopters lifted from the ground--an
impressive, powerful sight--with machine guns leaning out their open doors.
It occurred to me suddenly that all this military might was supposed to
be trained against a plant. The idea struck me as too absurd to be true.
Protecting U.S. oil interests?
What is the U.S. doing in Colombia,
if not waging war on a crop? Recent events shed some light on this question.
The Bush administration announced in February that their 2003 budget proposal
includes US$98 million in military aid to Colombia, designated for the
protection of the Cano Limon pipeline, which brings oil to the Los Angeles-based
Occidental Petroleum Company. If Congress passes the proposed new aid
this summer, it will be the first time the U.S. has contributed funds
directly to counter-insurgency efforts (the pipeline is regularly blown
up by guerrilla groups; the aid would assist the Colombian military in
its war against these guerrillas) rather than counter-narcotics.
Returning to the earlier question:
why would the displacement of farmers be in the interest of the U.S. or
Colombia? A partial answer can be found in what many analysts described
as the "eerie symmetry" between the areas most heavily fumigated
and the areas where oil deposits are known to exist. The Department of
Putumayo is situated in a corner of Colombia directly between Ecuador
and Venezuela, South America's leading oil producers. Though oil extraction
in Putumayo has been taking place for decades, it remains at a small scale
due to the threat of guerrilla attacks on pipelines, refineries and businesspeople.
For petroleum corporations to establish large-scale, profitable operations
in Colombia, they will need a greater degree of protection from guerrilla
attacks; this is precisely what the proposed new counterinsurgency aid
is designed to provide.
Occidental and other oil and coal
companies have been, along with military contractors, the strongest lobbyists
for ostensibly counter-narcotics-focused U.S. support to Plan Colombia
since 1999.(14)
Expanding the "War on
Terrorism"
Alongside and related to this
first explanation (that petroleum interests drive Plan Colombia militarization)
is another, more complex argument.
During the U.S. Super Bowl football
game this year, a new anti-drug campaign was launched through two expensive
30-second ads. The campaign--called The Anti-drug--also includes billboards
and an expansive web site (http://www.theantidrug.com).
The Super Bowl ads linked the purchase of drugs to the terrorist attacks
on Colombian judges and civilians. "Where do terrorists get their
money?" one ad asked. "If you buy drugs, some of it may come
from you." The argument is that, since Colombian guerrilla groups
profit from drug trafficking, the purchase of drugs supports terrorist
activities. A Brigadier General from the Colombian Ministry of Defense,
with whom we met, made similar claims to those made in the Super Bowl
ads.
The rationale, perhaps, is that
if the two appear to be indistinguishable, then there will be less opposition
to the currently proposed transition from a "War on Drugs" in
Colombia to a "War on Terrorism."
But what does this have to do
with the fumigations?
The delegation also met with Ricardo
Vargas, one of Latin America's leading drug policy analysts. He remarked
that, along with displacing farmers from potential oil-producing areas,
the fumigations tend to send those displaced farmers further into the
Amazon. In southern Colombia, right-wing paramilitaries currently control
many of the urban centers and larger villages; the FARC (Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia) tend to control outlying, rural areas. Thus
as farmers move further away from the cities and villages, hoping to evade
fumigation, they move further into guerrilla-controlled territory. Over
time, Vargas said, the overlap between areas of guerrilla control and
areas of drug production will increase as a result of the fumigations,
shoring up the currently tenuous argument that drug production and terrorism
are identical. The more persuasive this argument becomes, he observed,
the easier it will be for the U.S. to assume a more direct role in Colombia's
counterinsurgency war, in an attempt to establish more favorable conditions
for the entry of major oil (and other natural resource extraction) ventures.(15)
In the meantime--while all these
political, economic and military interests continue to work themselves
out, producing new policies and intensifications of war--chemicals fall
on the communities of Putumayo. The U.S. Embassy and State Department
refuse to entertain the possibility that the fumigations have negative
health impacts, and produce duplicitous studies to confirm their position.
Fish and livestock are killed. Farmers move into the rainforest, cut down
precious trees, and plant more coca. Food crops are decimated.
Farmers like Don Fernando are
left with ever more difficult decisions. The social pacts have proved
an enormous failure, and he is unlikely to be so naïve as to take
the government's word next time. Many of his neighbors have resettled
temporarily in the city, but Don Fernando needs to pay off the three loans
he took out last fall to plant pepper. The fruit trees on his property,
which withstood November's spraying, provide just enough food for his
family to eat, but Don Fernando needs income quickly. He has only one
real option.
Phillip Cryan recently completed
a Fellowship at PANNA. He will be moving to Bogotá in April, where
he will help coordinate Colombia delegations for Witness for Peace.
Notes
1 This is not the farmer's
real name.
2 Isacson, Adam. "The
Tragedy of Alternative Development in Colombia," Colombia Report,
December 3, 2001.
3 Bigwood, Jeremy. "DynCorp
in Colombia: Outsourcing the Drug War," CorpWatch, May 23, 2001.
4 Defensoria del Pueblo Director
of Collective Rights and the Environment, meeting with Witness for Peace
environmental delegation, January 18, 2002, Bogota.
5 Tatiana Roa, CENSAT AGUA
VIVA, meeting with Witness for Peace environmental delegation, January
17, 2002, Bogota.
6 "Efectos de la Fumigacion:
Valle del Guamuez y San Miguel, Putumayo," Departamento Administrativo
de Salud, February 2001; "Informe Tecnico de la Comision Internacional
Sobre Los Impactos en Territorio Ecuatoriano de las Fumigaciones Aereas
en Colombia," Adolfo Maldonado (with CONAIE, RAPAL, Accion Ecologica
and Instituto de Estudios Ecologistas del Tercer Mundo), July 2001.
7 "Informe Final: Estudio
de las Denuncias de Danos a la Salud Relacionadas con la Erradicacion
Aerea en Colombia, Departamento de Narino," September 2001 (published
by U.S. Embassy in Bogota).
8 Dyva Revelo Calderon (epidemiologist),
meeting with Witness for Peace environmental delegation, January 21, 2002,
Mocoa, Putumayo.
9 Ibid.
10 Not his real name.
11 "War on Drugs: Addicted
to Failure," Institute for Policy Studies, http://www.ips-dc.org/projects/drugpolicy.htm,
visited on March 7, 2002.
12 Sanho Tree (Institute for
Policy Studies), meeting with Witness for Peace delegations, January 15,
2002, Miami.
13 For example: "U.S.
Official Advocates Coordinated Drug Policy for Western Hemisphere,"
U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs, January
18, 2002.
14 Vaicius, Ingrid and Adam
Isacson. "Plan Colombia:' The Debate in Congress, 2000,"
Center for International Policy, December 2000.
15 Ricardo Vargas, meeting
with Witness for Peace delegation, January 25, 2002, Bogota.
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