NGOs Challenge World Bank's Rural Development Strategy

by Marcia Ishii-Eiteman
This month, government leaders, United Nations
officials and thousands of peasants, activists and ordinary people from
all corners of the world will gather in Johannesburg, South Africa to
forge a plan for environmentally sustainable development at local, national
and global levels. The World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannes-burg
is the second global conference on sustainability. At the first, ten years
ago in Rio de Janeiro, 178 governments committed to Agenda 21, a landmark
environmental and social document calling for development to relieve poverty,
injustice and disease while at the same time protecting the world's natural
and cultural resources. This month in Johannesburg, the world will weigh
progress towards meeting the commitments of Agenda 21.
Yet on the eve of the Johannesburg Summit,
the World Bank has chosen to take the opposite course, evidenced by its
recently released draft Rural Development Strategy. The strategy has drawn
sharp criticism from civil society leaders around the world, who argue
that it ignores the environmental ethic of Agenda 21 and is more likely
to increase rural poverty, indebtedness and hunger than relieve it. Critics
point to the Bank's emphasis on industrial agriculture, trade liberalization,
the privatization of public resources and its failure to address the political
and social causes of poverty.(1) In April, PANNA led an international
delegation to Washington, DC to lobby World Bank Directors to revise the
draft and subsequently sent a letter signed by 150 organizations in 40
countries urging the Board to reject the strategy (see Lobbying
Against the Strategy). It now appears that adverse reaction to the
draft has delayed approval and adoption of the Rural Development Strategy
by the Bank's Board.
Agenda 21, pesticides and the World Bank
Ten years ago in Rio, Agenda 21 was considered
a victory by many environmentalists, in part because it acknowledged the
devastating health and environmental impacts caused by overuse of pesticides
and called upon responsible agencies to reverse their harmful effects
by promoting ecologically based integrated pest management (IPM).(2) By
endorsing Agenda 21, governments and participating agencies such as the
United Nations and the World Bank made a commitment to support IPM rather
than toxic pesticides.
Throughout the 1990s, however, the World
Bank ignored Agenda 21, revising and weakening its own policy on pesticides
to merely "avoid the excessive use of pesticides."(3)
Finally in 1998, in response to mounting public pressure,(4) the Bank
issued a revised Operational Policy 4.09 on Pest Management, the official
policy that now guides all Bank lending.(5) This policy requires the Bank
to assist farmers in reducing their dependence on chemical pesticides
and to promote farmer-driven ecologically based pest management.
However, the Bank has not successfully implemented
this policy.(6) Many World Bank projects today still supply farmers with
toxic pesticides and introduce agricultural systems that lead farmers
to become highly dependent on chemical inputs and/or fail to provide effective
training in ecological alternatives -- all violations of the Bank's IPM
policy.(7)
Furthermore, the Bank continues to push
a broader agenda that favors large-scale industrial agriculture and benefits
multinational corporations -- including pesticide companies -- rather
than the world's rural poor. This bias toward industrial agriculture is
clearly reflected in the Bank's recently released draft Rural Development
Strategy (see Lobbying Against the
Strategy). Thus, in the ten years since Rio, the World Bank has not
only failed to implement Agenda 21's objectives regarding pesticides and
pest management, it has also undermined international commitments towards
sustainable agriculture and rural development through its relentless promotion
of corporate-dominated agriculture.
The World Bank's flawed approach to rural
development
The World Bank's draft Rural Development
Strategy is based upon the Bank's analysis of the causes of rural poverty
(notably climatic and technological constraints to agricultural production,
restricted markets and weak public sectors). Thus, the strategy's recommended
approach to eliminating poverty relies upon tools and mechanisms such
new technologies, private sector partnerships and market measures considered
congruent with that vision. Because many national governments, particularly
those seeking financial support in the form of development loans, look
to the World Bank for leadership, the strategy directly influences the
formation of rural development initiatives the world over.
Although the Bank's draft Rural Development
Strategy restates the Bank's commitment to poverty reduction, the document
fails to acknowledge the crippling effects of the Bank's trade liberalization
and privatization policies on the rural poor.(8) Grassroots organizations
and NGOs, argue that promotion of cash crops and water privatization have
disrupted food security and forced small farmers off the land.(9) The
strategy ostensibly supports locally based decision-making, yet disregards
the powerful influence of multinational corporations on national policy
and implementation of local projects.
While admitting that "the poor are
more affected by market failures," the World Bank strategy's focus
remains one of using market mechanisms to shift "subsistence-oriented"
and "small market-oriented" farmers into the commercial farm
sector. Yet reliance on global commodity markets is risky, and when export
crop prices drop, poor farmers suffer (as evidenced by the desperate plight
of small coffee producers today). Furthermore, the focus on export cash
crops (with the exception of specialty organic markets) almost invariably
leads to greater dependence on harmful chemical inputs and threatens human
health, biodiversity and soil, water and air quality.
The strategy does recognize the importance
of ecologically based pest management and reducing pesticide use, but
does not affirm the Bank's commitment to reducing reliance on pesticides,
a central requirement of the Bank's pest management policy. The strategy's
occasional reference to promoting organic agriculture and organic certification
is positive, but unfortunately overwhelmed by the strategy's overall emphasis
on industrialized agriculture, increased use of "modern inputs"
and the cultivation of high value export crops, generally grown with large
amounts of pesticides.
The World Bank's critics also argue that
commercialization of agriculture can lead to farm consolidation. This
occurs when small farmers sell out to large agribusinesses with greater
ability to purchase expensive inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, pesticides
and now even water (formerly a public good, but under policies promoted
by the World Bank, increasingly privatized). The Bank's strategy offers
no concrete or credible plan for protecting poor farmers from market failures
and in fact baldly suggests that if struggling farmers cannot compete
successfully in the commercial sector, they should abandon their livelihood
and culture, and seek off-farm employment instead.
To many civil society leaders heading to
Johannesburg in August, this approach is unconscionable and reflects a
reprehensible disregard for farmers' rights: the right to grow safe and
nutritious food, the right to a livelihood of their own choosing, and
the right to food security for their communities and food sovereignty
for their countries.
Wrong technologies
The draft Rural Development Strategy emphasizes
increasing investment in science and technology in order to increase productivity.
Certainly science by and for farmers has much to offer, but the strategy
ignores traditional knowledge and farmers' own scientific capacity, and
instead prioritizes private investment in "new" (and likely
expensive) technologies.
In the ten years since Rio, powerful biotechnology
companies have stepped up their promotion of genetically engineered seeds
as the solution to world hunger and poverty. Their strategy has included
targeting influential public institutions such as the World Bank, United
Nations and government agencies as high visibility partners whose support
will enhance the multinational corporations'credibility and increase the
sale of their products worldwide. Consequently, the World Bank is echoing
industry claims that genetic engineering in agriculture has "enormous
potential" to assist in poverty reduction and is already financing
research in the genetic engineering of seeds.(10)
The Bank's draft Rural Development Strategy
claims that "there is an emerging consensus in the scientific community
that biotechnology is likely to be a valuable tool in [the] struggle (to
increase agricultural productivity, alleviate rural poverty, enhance food
security and nutrition and conserve the environment)."(11)
In the context of World Bank partnerships with multinational corporations
that produce transgenic crops(12) and its current financing of transgenic
crops through project loans, it is reasonable to assume
that the strategy's reference to biotechnology
includes the genetic engineering of seeds. However, a growing number of
scientists and development experts are questioning the capacity of transgenic
crops to reduce poverty and hunger, while voicing concerns about the environmental
and health risks of the technology.(13)
Critics of agricultural biotechnology argue
that the release of transgenic crops into the environment can threaten
biodiversity, cause genetic contamination of conventional and organic
crops as well as indigenous landraces, threaten the safety of the food
supply, and pose serious risk of allergenicity to humans.(14) Furthermore,
many rural communities are rejecting transgenic crops because their use
frequently denies farmers' cultural right to save, breed and exchange
seed, while giving control of their food production to transnational corporations
that ultimately have no interest in their well being. Tens of thousands
of farmers in Brazil, India, Indonesia and elsewhere have organized mass
protests of GE crops and are demanding that their governments forbid importation
of GE seeds.(15)
In addition, a number of countries are unwilling
to import GE products, due to consumer rejection of genetically engineered
foods.(16) Farmers in Southern countries who export to markets in
Europe, Japan and Korea, for example, could find themselves at a grave
disadvantage if they start planting transgenic crops. These farmers would
be exposed to greater financial risk and increased vulnerability upon
adoption of such technologies.
Wrong partners
The draft Rural Development Strategy proposes
increased involvement of the private sector in virtually all aspects of
rural development, including research in science and technology, agricultural
extension, and access to global markets for new exports. Lip service is
given to the participation of local interests and civil society, but the
strategy does not suggest how this goal can and should be implemented.
While the private sector can contribute to sustainable development (particularly
by the action of locally owned small and medium sized enterprises), the
strategy indicates a preference for large transnational corporations with
no proven ability to reduce poverty and with track records of environmental
and human rights abuses.(17) The strategy asserts that private sector
investments must be protected, but makes no mention of how the excesses
of transnational corporations will be curbed, or the livelihoods and rights
of the poor protected.
In the name of poverty alleviation, the
World Bank has formed partnerships with some of the most notorious and
aggressive producers of hazardous pesticides. Within the framework of
the Bank's Staff Exchange Program, personnel exchanges routinely occur
between the World Bank and the major pesticide companies (e.g., Rhone-Poulenc
Agro (now Aventis(18)), AgrEvo (now also Aventis), Novartis (now Syngenta)
and Dow AgroSciences). (19) These companies have a long list of "red
flag" issues in which the companies have placed their commercial
interests above public interest. Examples include illegal toxic shipments,
chemical dumping and accidents, Superfund sites, chemical testing on humans,
false advertising, and convictions for racketeering.(20) Furthermore,
a number of these companies have histories of unethical manipulation of
pesticide registration decisions, corruption, refusal to withdraw products
that have caused frequent casualties and use of massive public relations
campaigns to deceive the public about the health and environmental risks
of their products.
World Bank partnerships with pesticide companies
to promote "safe use" are also unlikely to lead to reduced use,
or even safer use, of pesticides. Field studies and independent assessment
of industry's "safe use campaigns" have found no credible evidence
that these trainings have reduced either use or incidence of pesticide
poisoning. (21) In some cases they have had the opposite effect,
particularly when used as a marketing tool to showcase products.(22)
Even the Novartis Foundation concludes that safe use programs are not
effective in changing farmers' behaviors and that when pesticide manufacturers
cannot guarantee the safe handling and use of hazardous products, these
products should be withdrawn from the market.(23)
For taxpayer monies to support the placement
of World Bank staff at pesticide/biotech companies constitutes a gross
violation of the Bank's pest management policy and its business partnership
guidelines.(24) It is also antithetical to the Bank's commitment
to sustainable development and a misuse of public funds.
Another way forward
The World Bank has an opportunity to show
leadership in its approach to rural development by revising its draft
strategy to reflect the needs and concerns of the rural poor. A sound
rural development strategy should start with an accurate assessment of
the social and political roots of poverty. It should provide an effective
plan of action to enable countries to move away from corporate-controlled
agriculture and towards locally owned agriculture that relies on environmentally
sustainable methods such as organic farming. The strategy should emphasize
proven low-cost, low-risk agricultural technologies (such as ecologically
based IPM and low external input sustainable farming) rather than inadequately
tested, risky technologies such as genetic engineering.(25)
Suitable partners would include peasant
and producer organizations, NGOs, and international institutions with
proven capacity to empower farmers. Carefully selected private sector
entities, such as producers of biological pest control agents, food and
commodity producers, processors and retailers with an interest in reducing
pesticide residues, would also be appropriate.
A revised strategy must uphold workers'
and farmers' rights to produce safe and nutritious food for themselves
and their communities and to retain decision-making control over their
choice of livelihood and methods of agriculture. It should uphold the
right to food security and food sovereignty. The strategy should also
articulate a plan for regulating the private sector, particularly transnational
corporations, in order to prevent violations of human and environmental
rights. In addition to organic certification, the strategy should promote
Fair Trade certification.
Ultimately, however, for the World Bank
to achieve lasting progress towards the environmentally sustainable development
goals outlined in Agenda 21, the Bank must cease promoting the industrial
model of agriculture through its structural adjustment loans and other
measures. It must also reduce the influence of multinational corporations
in the design and implementation of its projects, policies and strategies
and redirect its vast resources towards supporting community-based approaches
to safe, equitable and sustainable food production.
Marcia Ishii-Eiteman is PANNA's World
Bank Accountability Project Coordinator. The author would like to thank
Jessica Hamburger and Phoenix Lawhon for their valuable input to this
article.
Notes
1 To view PANNA's critique and other NGO
comments on the Bank's Rural Development Strategy, see: http://www.panna.org/campaigns/docsWorldBank/docsWorldBank_020614.dv.html.
2 Pest management is addressed in Chapter
14.7 of Agenda 21, available at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/index.htm
3 World Bank. Operational Policy 4.09
on Pest Management, 1996 version. Washington DC: World Bank, 1996.
4 Joint letter to World Bank President
James Wolfensohn from more than 180 organizations and concerned individuals
from around the world. November 8, 1996. Available at http://www.panna.org/campaigns/worldBank.html.
5 World Bank. Operational Policy 4.09
on Pest Management. World Bank, Washington DC, 1998. Available at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/Institutional/Manuals/OpManual.nsf/OPolw/665DA6CA847982168525672C007D07A3?OpenDocument.
6 Several studies document the Bank's
failure to implement its IPM policy. See Tozun N. New policy, old patterns:
a survey of IPM in World Bank Projects. Global Pesticide Campaigner
2001; 11(1):1,14-15. San Francisco: PANNA. Also, a 1997 Bank review
found that out of 150 of its agricultural projects, only 22 referred
to IPM; of those, half included financing for chemical pesticides with
no description of any kind of IPM strategy. World Bank. Integrated pest
management: strategy and policy options for effective implementation.
Environmentally Sustainable Development Monograph Series No. 13. Washington
DC: World Bank, 1997. See also Hansen M. The First Three Years: Implementation
of the World Bank Pesticide Guidelines. New York: Consumer Policy Institute,
1990.
7 As an example, see Ishii-Eiteman, M,
Ardhianie N. 2002. Community monitoring of integrated pest management
versus conventional pesticide use in a World Bank project in Indonesia.
Intl J Occup Env Health, April/June 2002, vol 8 no 2. See also Yayasan
Duta Awam. Monitoring partisipatif terhadap proyek pengembangan rawa
terpadu (Participatory Monitoring of the Integrated Swamps Development
Project, World Bank Loan 3755 IND). Solo, Indonesia, Yayasan Duta Awam,
1999.
8 The harmful effects of World Bank structural
adjustment policies are documented in The Policy Roots of Economic
Crisis and Poverty: A Multi-Country Participatory Assessment of Structural
Adjustment, The Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International
Network, April 2002, http://www.saprin.org.
9 Several statements from locally connected
non governmental organizations attending the World Food Summit in Rome
in June 2002 voiced alarm at privitatization and trade liberalization
policies. In the New Straits Times, June14, 2002, "NGOs slam Food
Summit declaration," Sarojeni Rengam of Pesticide Action Network
Asia and the Pacific in Malaysia states that, "Governments and
international institutions had presided over globalisation and liberalisation
since 1996, intensifying the structural causes of hunger and malnutrition."
"These have forced markets open to dumping of agricultural products,
privatisation of basic social and economic support institutions, the
privatisatiion and commodification of communal and public land, water,
fishing grounds and forests." She said there would be no progress
toward the goal of eliminating hunger without a reversal of such policies."
10 The World Bank has already approved
US$50 million in project loans for agricultural biotechnology, including
transgenic crops such as Bt rice, Bt cotton and sweet potato. World
Bank Technical Briefing from the Vice President and Secretary. Biotechnology
for Poverty Alleviation and Economic Growth: challenges and options
for the World Bank. January 7, 2002.
11 http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/ESSD/rdv/vta.nsf/Gweb/Strategy.
12 Ishii-Eiteman M, Hamburger J. Pesticide
and biotech companies: the wrong partners for the World Bank. San Francisco,
CA: PANNA, 2002. Available at http://www.panna.org/campaigns/worldBank.html.
13 Altieri M, Rosset P. Ten reasons why
biotechnology will not ensure food security, protect the environment
and reduce poverty in the developing world. Oakland CA: Food First/Institute
for Food and Development Policy. 2001. Also see references within. See
also Rissler J, Mellon M. The Ecological Risks of Engineered Crops.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996.
14 Evidence has recently emerged that
Mexican indigenous maize varieties have been contaminated by genetically
engineered corn. See Quist D, Chapela I. "Transgenic DNA introgressed
into traditional maize landraces in Oaxaca, Mexico, Nature, November
29, 2001, Vol 414, pp 541-543. See also Rissler J, Mellon M. op.cit.
15 Shiva V. Stolen Harvest: the hijacking
of the global food supply. Cambridge MA: South End Press, 2000. See
also articles in Pesticide Action Network Asia and Pacific. Say No to
Genetic Engineering. Penang, Malaysia: PANAP. 1998.
16 For example, the European Union has
rejected Chinese soy sauce because it was made with US soybeans considered
likely to be transgenic. Similarly, Namibia's beef exports to Europe
are at risk since Namibian cattle are fed South African maize which
cannot be guaranteed to be free of transgenic material. (Seccombe, A.
"S. Africa maize threatens Namibia beef exports." Reuters,
February 17, 2000.)
17 The strategy's summary highlights President
Wolfensohn's closed door meeting in December 2001 with the CEOs of the
top pesticide/biotech companies as an example of the type of private
sector links that the Bank intends to pursue. NGOs around the world
denounced that meeting as another example of backroom deal-making between
the Bank and powerful transnational corporations that have consistently
placed their immediate commercial interests over the long term health
of the rural poor and the environment.
18 Bayer is currently in the process of
acquiring Aventis CropScience.
19 World Bank Staff Exchange Program website,
http://www.staffexchange.org.
20 Pesticide Action Network North America.
Corporate profiles for Bayer, Dow, Dupont, Monsanto, Syngenta. San Francisco:
PANNA, 2002. Available at http://www.panna.org/resources/wb.html.
21 Murray DL, Taylor PL. Claim no easy
victories: evaluating the pesticide industry's global safe use campaign.
World Development. 2000; 28(10):1735-1749. See also Hruska A.
"CARE Reduces Pesticide Use Around the World," Global Pesticide
Campaigner, May 1993.
22 Murray DL. Cultivating Crisis: the
Human Cost of Pesticides in Latin America. Austin TX: University of
Texas Press, 1994.
23 Atkin J (Novartis Crop Protection Sector),
Leisinger KM (Novartis Foundation for Sustainable Development). Safe
and effective use of crop protection products in developing countries.
UK: CABI, 2000.
24 Business Partnership & Outreach
Group, The World Bank Group. Partnerships with the Private Sector: Assessment
and Approval. Washington DC: The World Bank Group. Available at http://www.worldbank.org/business/03assessment.html#guidance.
25 A growing body of data from around
the world indicates that community-based diversified agricultural systems
are more appropriate for local ecosystems and the needs and values of
local cultures. They are also highly productive, less vulnerable to
risk and better able to ensure local and national food security and
food sovereignty. Pretty JN. "Going back to our roots." Available
at: http://info.tve.org/lps/doc.cfm?aid+651. See also Pretty JN. Regenerating
Agriculture: policies and practice for sustainability and self-reliance.
London: Earthscan, 1995 and examples provided at http://www.farmingsolutions.org.
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