PANNA: Pesticide and Biotech Companies: The Wrong Partners for the World Bank


Pesticide and Biotech Companies: The Wrong Partners for the World Bank

By Marcia Ishii-Eiteman and Jessica Hamburger

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Recognizing that private sector flows are much larger and more influential than multilateral development lending, the World Bank has sought to leverage its loans through partnerships with private companies. The goal of these partnerships is to “make private flows bigger, better and of greater benefit to the poor.”1 When it comes to agricultural development, however, the World Bank’s business partnerships tend to benefit large pesticide and biotech corporations more often than poor farmers. The partnerships promote increased use of pesticides and genetically engineered crops, jeopardizing the health of farmers participating in World Bank-financed projects and the ecological stability of their farming systems.

Guidelines for assessing potential private sector partners
The World Bank has developed guidelines to ensure that its private sector partnerships are compatible with its mission. 2 The guidelines state that the core principles underpinning all Bank Group guidelines and policies, including the Safeguard Policy on pest management, apply to private sector partnerships wherever relevant. The guidelines also require the Bank to evaluate each proposed partnership against the following key risk areas before entering into the partnership:
• Reputation: “Does the company have a good reputation (no serious red flag issue areas), especially in areas of corporate social responsibility?”3
• Conflict of Interest: “Is the company only or primarily looking for procurement opportunities or money from the World Bank Group?”4
• Unfair Advantage: Would the relationship allow “special advantages to accrue to the partner, such as access to information, market advantage or procurement under projects financed by the World Bank Group”?5
• Governance: “Is the partnership aligned with priorities in relevant World Bank Group country and/or sector strategy?”6

In cases where the risks are deemed high, the Guidelines state clearly that the partnership should not take place. Partnership relations must not adversely affect the Bank Group’s ability to act independently, its reputation of neutrality/impartiality, or its ability to act as an ‘honest broker’ in decision-making and providing advice to its clients. The examples below illustrate ways in which the World Bank, by entering into partnerships with pesticide and biotech companies, has failed to comply with its business partnership guidelines.

Note: The WB Guidelines apply to all stages of the partnership cycle, including the initial step of brainstorming on partnership possibilities and identifying suitable partners. Furthermore, a formal review process is required for all proposed private sector partnerships that pose a major reputational risk to the Bank Group.7

Reputation
The World Bank has entered into partnerships with some of the most notorious and aggressive producers of hazardous pesticides. Within the framework of the Bank’s staff exchange program, personnel exchanges routinely occur between the World Bank and the major pesticide companies (e.g., Rhône- Poulenc Agro (now Aventis), AgrEvo (now Aventis), Novartis (now Syngenta) and Dow AgroSciences).8 These companies have a long list of “red flag” issues in which the companies have placed their commercial interests above public interest: illegal toxic shipments, chemical dumping and accidents, Superfund sites, chemical testing on humans, false advertising, and racketeering convictions. Furthermore, these companies have histories of unethical manipulation of pesticide registration decisions, corruption, refusal to withdraw products that are known to cause high frequency of casualties and use of massive public relations budgets to deceive the public about the health and environmental risks of their products, even when concerns have been raised by independent sources. (See company profiles for details.)

World Bank President James Wolfensohn has initiated the first phase of a new partnership cycle by inviting CEOs of the major pesticide and biotechnology companies to a roundtable discussion in December 2000, the stated purpose of which was to identify possible areas of collaboration. This type of high level consultation, the staff exchanges, Bank management’s ongoing meetings with pesticide industry representatives and its actual partnerships with these companies pose serious reputational risks to the Bank Group and should have been prevented by adherence to the Partnership Guidelines.

Governance
World Bank guidelines state that private sector partnerships should be pursued only if they advance the priorities identified in country and sector strategies, such as reducing reliance on pesticides, alleviating poverty and protecting the environment. It is difficult to imagine how a partnership with a pesticide company could be aligned with the Bank’s policy on pest management, which seeks to reduce reliance on pesticides. Even World Bank partnerships with pesticide companies that focus on so-called “safe use” training are unlikely to lead to reduced or even safer use of pesticides.

Even World Bank partnerships with pesticide companies that focus on so-called “safe use” training are unlikely to lead to reduced or even safer use of pesticides. Field studies and inde- Pesticide Action Network North America World Bank Accountability Project pendent assessment of industry’s “safe use campaign” have found no credible evidence that these trainings have reduced either use or incidence of pesticide poisoning. In some cases they have had the opposite effect, particularly when used as a marketing tool to showcase products.9 In addition, as these and other studies have shown, most safety measures are impractical in the context of farming in developing countries. For example, protective clothing and equipment is either too costly or too uncomfortable to use in hot tropical conditions common in developing countries.

Moreover, partnerships with pesticide and biotechnology companies that are vigorously promoting their products in the ways described above and in the attached corporate profiles are unlikely to facilitate the Bank’s efforts to reduce poverty and may even exacerbate it. In Indonesia, for example, a World Bank-financed project supplied farmers with pesticides and provided chemical companies with new opportunities to advertise their products in remote areas.10 As their use of pesticides rose, many participating farmers were subsequently unable to repay the cost of these inputs and fell deeper into debt.11 Meanwhile, the pesticide companies that gain access to rural communities through Bank partnerships, continue to introduce products that poison millions around the world, particularly poor farmers and their children in many of the Bank’s client countries.12

World Bank partnerships with pesticide and biotech companies are also likely to conflict with the Bank’s commitment to environmental protection. The corporations that develop and market these products have consistently placed their immediate commercial interests over the long term health of the environment. As a result, pesticides aggressively promoted by industry continue to contaminate soil, water and air, harm wildlife and disrupt the balance of ecosystems,13 while the release of inadequately tested transgenic crops into the environment brings new threats to biodiversity; can cause genetic contamination of crops and their wild relatives; threatens food safety; and poses serious risk of allergenicity to humans.14

Conflict of Interest and Unfair Advantage: The Case of Rhone-Poulenc

The French pesticide company Rhône-Poulenc Agro used its
relationship with the World Bank to promote its pesticide
products and break into new markets in West Africa. In a
January 1998 press release, Rhône-Poulenc stated, in reference
to lucrative partnership agreements it had just signed with the
governments of Cameroon and Senegal, that “the agreements
are part of a wider programme, coordinated by the World
Bank and covering West and Central Africa, which should be
established on the Ivory Coast in early 1998. They enable
Rhône-Poulenc Agro, already active in the cotton and banana
markets of the region, to break into the cocoa, coffee, rice and
vegetable markets, which account for around 40% of the crop
protection market in this region.”1

The World Bank was not an unwitting partner to Rhône-
Poulenc’s strategic plan to expand its market share in West
Africa. During the late 90s, the WB placed one of its staff,
Alassane Sow, at Rhône-Poulenc through the WB’s Staff
Exchange Program. Sow’s assignment was to manage “partnership
programs between Rhône-Poulenc Agro and rural development
institutions in several African countries.”2 Perhaps not
coincidentally, during Sow’s tenure there, Cameroon, Cote
d’Ivoire and Ghana all submitted project proposals to the
World Bank containing a potentially significant role in agricultural
extension for a company like Rhône-Poulenc.

The Cameroon project appraisal document specifically mentioned
a signed agreement between the Bank and Rhône-
Poulenc;3 the World Bank also reported its emerging partnership
with Rhône-Poulenc which would enable the company to
“launch a pilot initiative… to train subject matter specialists in
the use of a number of its products (herbicides and fungicides)
which will be introduced to farmers. Rhône-Poulenc staff…
will supervise demonstration plots with extension staff.”4 In
Ghana, Sow wrote a letter to the Ministry of Food and
Agriculture laying out a framework for a “collaboration
between Rhône-Poulenc and the Ministry” which he copied to
the World Bank. Three months later, Ghana submitted a proposal
to the Bank which discussed rules “governing the generation,
importation and distribution of… herbicides (and) pesticides”
and aimed to “remove bottlenecks that impede or
restrict these activities.”5

The relationship between the World Bank and Rhône-Poulenc
raises serious issues of conflict of interest and unfair
advantage.6 Rhône-Poulenc clearly benefited financially from
its partnership with the World Bank, while its access to WB
staff, information and support gave it a marked advantage over
other companies and private sector entities that might have
put forth a less chemical-intensive approach to development.

Furthermore, the special relationship raises a very large red flag
regarding compliance with the Safeguard Policy OP 4.09 on
pest management. OP 4.09 specifically requires WB lending to
help borrower countries reduce reliance on synthetic chemical
pesticides and promote farmer-driven ecologically based integrated
pest management. In Senegal, pesticides used on tomato
were replaced by Rhône-Poulenc pesticides, and the frequency
of application was further increased. Some of the products
did not meet the selection criteria of OP 4.09 or were not
permitted for use on tomato in the E.U. or U.S.

The Bank’s decision to conduct staff exchanges with multinational
pesticide companies and its special partnership with
Rhône-Poulenc, a company that was openly trying to “break
into markets” in West Africa, undermines the Bank’s ability to
implement its IPM policy and to act as an honest broker in
decision-making and providing advice to its clients.

Notes
1 http://www.rhone-poulenc.com. After Rhône-Poulenc Agro merged with Aventis, the Web site was removed.
2 http://www.worldbank.org/hrs/sep/perspectives/worldbank/asow_sep_profiles.html
3 World Bank. Cameroon National Agricultural Extension and Research Program Support Project, Project
Appraisal Document, 1998; p.18.
4 World Bank. Findings, Africa Region. No. 26, March 1998 (available at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/findings/
infobeng/infob2.htm)
5 World Bank. Ghana Agricultural Subsector Services Investment Program (GHPE98). Project Information
Document. April 14, 1999.
6 The WB Guidelines on private sector partnerships define “conflict of interest risks” as “entailing a conflict between the private partner’s involvement in upstream…project/program design work and subsequent intention to be involved in linked downstream work, be it in the form of further consultant services or provision of goods and services.” “Unfair advantage risks” are described as those “conferring unfair advantage on a single company . . . allowing them to use the Bank’s name in a manner that implies an endorsement of, or preference for, the company’s products or services,” “allowing publicity . . .which suggests that the World Bank Group endorses the company or their products,” and “allowing special advantages, preferences or benefits to accrue to the private sector partner. These might include access to information, market advantage or procurement under projects financed by the World Bank Group.”


Conclusion
By their very nature, partnerships with pesticide and biotechnology companies are highly unlikely to conform with the Bank’s guidelines for avoiding reputational risk, conflict of interest, unfair advantage and governance issues. The examples above and the historical evidence documented in the accompanying corporate profiles illustrate that these companies are clearly the wrong partners for the World Bank. Instead, partnerships with producers of biological pest control agents, food and commodity producers, processors and retailers with an interest in reducing pesticide residues, and NGOs and public interest groups that do not have a vested financial interest in the outcome of development decisions are far more likely to lead to sustainable production, poverty alleviation and environmental protection.

Notes
1 Partnerships with the Private Sector: Assessment and Approval, Business Partnership & Outreach Group, The World Bank Group, Washington, DC. World Bank Web site http://www.worldbank.org/business/03assessment.html#guidance.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 http://www.staffexchange.org
9 Murray, DL & PL Taylor, Claim no easy victories: evaluation of pesticide industry’s global safe use campaign, World Development 2000, 28:1735-49. See also Murray, D., Cultivating Crisis: the Human Cost of Pesticides in Latin America. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1994 and Hruska, A., CARE reduces pesticide use around the world.
Global Pesticide Campaigner, May 1993.
10 Ishii-Eiteman, M. & N. Ardianie, Community monitoring of IPM vs. pesticide use in a World Bank project in
Indonesia, Intl J Occup Envir Health, 2002. Forthcoming.
11 Yayasan Duta Awam. Participatory monitoring of the World Bank’s Integrated Swamps Development Project (Loan
3755 IND), Solo, Indonesia, 1999.
12 World Health Organization, The Public Health Impacts of Pesticides Use in Agriculture, Geneva, Switzerland: World
Health Organization, 1990. See also Wesseling, C. et al., Agricultural pesticide use in developing countries: health
effects and research needs, Int J Health Services, 1997, vol. 27:273-308 and Jeyaratnam, J. Acute pesticide poisoning:
a major global health problem. World Health Stat Quarterly, 1990; vol. 43:139-44.
13 Dinham, B., The Pesticide Hazard: a Global Health and Environmental Audit, London, UK: Zed Books for the
Pesticide Trust, 1993. See also Pimental, D. Green revolution agriculture and chemical hazards, The Science of the
Total Environment, 1996; 188 suppl. 1: S86-S98.
14 Rissler, J. and M. Mellon. The Ecological Risks of Engineered Crops, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA., 1996. .

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